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The Role of Accounting Conservatism in Firms’ Financial Decisions 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper investigates whether financial reporting conservatism is related to firms’ financial flexibility 
and their access to capital. If conservatism facilitates monitoring and governance by capital providers, 
they should be more willing to extend financing and increase firms’ access to capital. However, because 
conservatism leads to systematic understatement of net worth and weakens the appearance of firms’ 
balance sheet strength, it could also reduce firms’ access to capital. This study tests these two opposing 
views of the relationship between conservatism and firms’ financial flexibility. Results indicate that firms 
with greater reporting conservatism exhibit less flexibility in their corporate liquidity management, in 
their debt or equity issuance decisions, in the sensitivity of their investments to financing constraints and 
in their payout policies. Overall, results suggest that although firms enjoy lower debt contracting costs by 
reporting conservatively, they forgo some flexibility in future access to capital, and this affects their 
financial decisions. 
 
 
Key words: Financial Reporting Conservatism, Access to Capital, Financial Constraints
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1. Introduction 
 Financial reporting conservatism is one of the most prominent qualitative attributes of accounting, 
and its economic role and continued existence have been a focus of debate and research attention among 
regulators, practitioners and academics (e.g., FASB [2005], Watts [2003]). Standard setters prefer 
financial accounting information to be neutral and free of bias, and they oppose including the concept of 
conservatism as a desirable qualitative characteristic of accounting information in the conceptual 
framework (FASB [2005]). On the other hand, researchers reason that accounting conservatism exists in 
response to economic demand for verifiable and timely information that mitigates agency problems in 
contracting, and in response to changes in the regulatory and litigation environments (Holthausen and 
Watts [2001], Watts [2003]). In empirical studies, researchers generally find evidence in support of the 
contracting and governance role of conservatism in both equity (LaFond and Roychowdhury [2008]; 
LaFond and Watts [2008]) and debt markets (Zhang [2008]). However, although prior work asserts the 
role and benefits of accounting conservatism to lenders and borrowers in external financial contracting, 
there is scant research examining how reporting conservatism shapes firms’ internal financial decisions. 
The effective allocation of capital, the efficient management of corporate liquidity, the choice of debt or 
equity capital and the design of payout policies are important financial decisions in which accounting 
information can play an important role. This paper contributes to existing literature and investigates 
whether reporting conservatism is related to firms’ financial flexibility and their financial decisions. 
  
 Financial flexibility is the ability of a firm to access and restructure its financing at a low cost. 
Financially flexible firms are able to avoid financial distress in the face of negative shocks and to fund 
investment readily when profitable opportunities arise (Gamba and Triantis [2008], p.2263). In existing 
literature, it is reasoned that accounting conservatism assists monitoring and governance by limiting 
managers’ ability to overstate financial performance opportunistically and thus facilitates the transfer of 
control rights to capital providers when covenant or performance thresholds are not satisfied (LaFond and 
Watts [2008], Zhang [2008]). If conservatism assists monitoring and governance by capital providers, 
debt or equity providers should be more willing to extend financing and increase firms’ access to capital. 
If these conditions hold, I predict firms with greater reporting conservatism should exhibit greater 
financial flexibility (“Efficient Contracting View”). 
 
  On the other hand, conservative accounting leads to a cumulative understatement of net assets in the 
balance sheet and more timely recognition of losses versus gains in the income statement. Thus, the book 
leverage ratio (debt-to-asset) of the firm is systematically overstated compared to the true economic 
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leverage, and net worth is systematically understated compared to the true economic firm value. Both of 
these effects weaken the appearance of the firms’ balance sheet strength and may therefore reduce firms’ 
access to capital. Therefore, I predict firms that have adopted greater reporting conservatism should 
experience less financial flexibility (“Distortion of Information View”).  
 
 This study tests these two opposing views of the relationship between conservatism and financial 
flexibility and its resulting effect on corporate financial activities. This inquiry is important because 
although prior work claims that reporting conservatism benefits borrowers by lowering initial interest 
rates, it also finds that conservatism shifts power to the lenders by increasing the likelihood of covenant 
violations (Zhang [2008]). As such, a finding that conservatism is associated with lower interest rates is 
not conclusive evidence of debt contracting efficiency because lenders will accept a lower interest rate in 
return for more frequent transfer of control rights (Gigler et al. [2009]). Clearly, a debt contract that has a 
low interest rate but gives lenders decision rights in all states of the world is not efficient. Therefore, 
besides using the interest rate as a criterion for evaluating the contractual benefits of reporting 
conservatism, it is imperative to examine how conservatism relates to financial flexibility if we are to 
achieve a better understanding of whether conservatism actually increases debt contracting efficiency. 
 
 To test these predictions, I first examine whether accounting conservatism is related to corporate cash 
holdings and firms’ propensity to save. When capital markets are frictionless, firms always have access to 
financing for their positive net present value (NPV) projects, and there is little incentive for cash holdings 
beyond holding cash for transaction purposes (Baumol [1952], Miller and Orr [1966]). However, when 
firms face uncertainty regarding future access to capital to fund their investments, they hold more cash for 
precautionary purposes (Opler et al. [1999]). If reporting conservatism facilitates financial contracting, I 
expect firms with greater reporting conservatism to have better access to financing, and to hold less 
precautionary cash. Using a measure of conservatism derived from Dichev and Tang [2008], I find that 
firms that have a greater propensity to recognize expenses ahead of their associated revenue (more 
conservative firms) hold more cash, even after controlling for industry effects. In addition, firms that 
exhibit greater reporting conservatism have a greater propensity to save. The latter result suggests that 
firms with greater reporting conservatism exhibit less financial flexibility and hence accumulate cash in 
order to build up internal capital to finance future investment opportunities when future financing is 
uncertain (Almeida et al. [2004]). 
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 Next, I examine whether accounting conservatism is related to firms’ decisions to issue debt or 
equity. If conservatism eases financial friction, I expect conservative firms to raise capital through the 
debt market, given that issuing debt is less costly than equity. However, if conservatism exacerbates 
financial constraints, I expect conservative firms to raise capital through the equity market in order to 
strengthen their balance sheet and to increase debt capacity. Moreover, I expect these financially 
constrained firms to have less flexibility in timing their equity issuance during good macroeconomic 
conditions. Consistent with the latter prediction, I find that firms that exhibit greater reporting 
conservatism are more likely to issue equity, but they are less likely to do so following stock price run-
ups. 
 
 In additional tests, I examine whether these financial constraints associated with greater reporting 
conservatism affect firms’ investment and payout policies. I find that firms with greater reporting 
conservatism also exhibit greater cash flow sensitivity of investment, suggesting that even though 
reporting conservatism limits over-investment (Francis and Martin [2010]), it may result in under-
investment in positive NPV projects (Roychowdhury [2010]). I also find that firms with greater reporting 
conservatism have lower dividend changes following positive cash changes, but reporting conservatism is 
not differentially associated with stock repurchase changes following positive cash changes. These results 
suggest that firms with greater reporting conservatism likely experience less financial flexibility and 
hence are more reluctant to commit to a consistent higher payout policy via dividends and are also more 
inclined to distribute excess cash via repurchases that require less commitment for future payouts.  
 
 The results are robust with regard to both firm-year specific and cross-sectional regression 
specifications, inclusion of industry and time fixed-effects, controlling for other governance mechanisms 
and using an alternative measure of reporting conservatism (Basu [1997]). To mitigate the possibility that 
my results may have been driven by reverse causality, I include firm fixed-effects that control for time-
invariant firm characteristics and conduct lead-lag analyses in additional robustness tests. The main 
inferences are unchanged. Overall, the analyses suggest that firms with greater accounting conservatism 
likely face less flexibility in their corporate financial activities. These results also suggest that although 
firms enjoy lower debt contracting costs and mitigate agency conflicts by reporting conservatively (e.g., 
Zhang [2008]), they forgo some financial flexibility in future access to capital, and this affects their 
financial decisions. 
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 This paper extends the existing literature in several ways. First, this study relates to studies examining 
the role of accounting conservatism. Prior research generally claims that conservatism reduces the cost of 
debt. However, these studies’ findings are only generalizable to firms actually able to obtain the desired 
amount of capital through debt markets. Firms face not only price constraints (interest rates) but also 
quantity constraints (amount of borrowing) in financing, and hence, cost of debt cannot be the sole 
criterion for evaluating the benefits of conservatism. I extend prior findings by documenting the 
relationship between reporting conservatism and firms’ financial decisions, which ultimately determine 
their liquidity management, choice of financing, investment-cash flow sensitivity, and payout policies. 
This analysis is important to our complete understanding about how financial reporting behavior relates 
both to firms’ external financial contracting and to their internal corporate financial activities.  
 
 Second, this study relates to the existing literature examining the real effects of accounting. In prior 
work, considerable effort has been made to document the impact of financial reporting quality on the cost 
of equity or debt capital (e.g., Francis et al. [2004]). However, there is a dearth of research examining the 
impact of financial reporting on financial decisions. In their review paper, Armstrong et al. [2010, p.214] 
write, “[w]e also encourage researchers to explore the more fundamental decision of how financial 
reporting influences the firm’s decision regarding the type of financing to pursue.” This study makes a 
first step in this direction. 
 
 Armstrong et al. [2010, p.214) also note that “[t]here has been relatively little research on the role of 
financial reporting in determining whether a firm can obtain debt financing” and “[w]e conjecture that 
this lack of research is at least in part attributable to the difficulty identifying firms that would like to 
borrow (or obtain minority shareholders) but are unable to find a willing lender and therefore do not 
participate in the debt markets.” If financial reporting affects lending decisions, it should also affect 
firms’ access to capital and their propensity to save and hold cash. Thus, this study extends the existing 
literature by indirectly examining the role of financial reporting in the lending decision by inferring firms’ 
access to capital through their financial activities. 
 
 Finally, this study contributes to the corporate finance literature. Financial economists and the 
business press have been interested in why firms hold increasingly larger cash reserves over time (Bates 
et al. [2009]). Finding and explaining an association between accounting conservatism and firms’ 
propensity to hold cash enhances our understanding of this important topic.  
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 A related paper by Louis et al. [2009] examines accounting conservatism and the market valuation of 
cash holdings, and their results are complementary to mine. Specifically, these authors find that the value 
of cash holdings is higher for firms with greater reporting conservatism because of better governance 
associated with conservatism, and this result may partially explain my finding that conservative firms 
hold more cash. However, their results cannot fully explain my finding that firms with greater reporting 
conservatism appear to exhibit less financial flexibility in their debt or equity issuance decision, 
investment-cash flow sensitivity, and payout policies. 
 
2. Related Literature and Hypothesis Development 
2.1 Accounting Conservatism and Financial Flexibility: Efficient Contracting View 
 Prior literature defines accounting conservatism as “the differential verifiability required for 
recognition of profit versus losses (Watts [2003], p.208).”1 The consequence of reporting conservatism is 
the accelerated recognition of losses versus gains and the recognition of expenses ahead of their 
associated revenue, both of which lead to systematic understatement of net asset values.2 In prior work, it 
is reasoned that reporting entities practice conservatism in response to economic demand for verifiable 
and timely information that mitigates agency problems in contracting, and in response to changes in the 
regulatory and litigation environments (Holthausen and Watts [2001], Watts [2003]). 
 
 An extensive body of accounting literature examines the role of conservatism in efficient debt 
contracting. Ball and Shivakumar [2005] identify two distinct concepts of conservatism that mitigate 
manager-debtholders agency conflicts: (a) imposing a downward bias on reported net worth to alleviate 
managers’ tendency to bias net worth upwards; and (b) committing managers to recognizing bad news in 
a timely manner. These two aspects of conservatism constrain managers’ incentives to transfer wealth to 
shareholders to the detriment of debtholders3 and provide timely information to debtholders that allows 
transfer of control rights to them when firms’ financial condition deteriorates and covenants are violated. 
                                                          
1 According to the FASB Statement of Concepts No. 2, conservatism is defined as “a prudent reaction to uncertainty 
to try to ensure that uncertainty and risks inherent in business situations are adequately considered.” 
2 In this discussion, I do not differentiate between conservatism in accounting methods (e.g., expensing of research 
and development costs, choice of depreciation method) from conservatism in the recognition of losses versus gains 
(or asymmetric timeliness). My empirical measures will reflect these two sources of accounting conservatism (see 
section 3.1 and section 6.4 respectively). 
3 For example, managers could substitute assets towards high risk, negative NPV projects that benefit shareholders 
in only good states of the world or distribute assets to shareholders, both of which reduce the expected value of 
debtholders’ claim. 
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Two key assumptions underlie debtholders’ preference for reporting conservatism: (a) debtholders have 
asymmetric payoffs with respect to the firms’ net assets and hence are more concerned with information 
about the lower ends of the earnings and net assets distribution; and (b) debt contracts and their associated 
covenants are written over accounting numbers, and it is costly to write contracts that adjust these 
numbers (Guay and Verrecchia [2006], Watts [2003]). 
 
 Empirically, Zhang [2008] finds that conservatism is associated with lower initial interest rates and 
higher likelihood of covenant violations following large negative shocks, which she interprets as 
suggestive of the contractual benefits of conservatism to both lenders and borrowers. Subsequent work 
also finds empirical support for the role of conservatism in mitigating firms’ and debtholders’ conflicts in 
private debt markets (Beatty et al. [2008], Wittenberg-Moerman [2008]), public debt markets (Nikolaev 
[2010]), and syndicated loan markets (Ball et al. [2008]).  
 
 Outside debt contracting settings, prior work also examines the governance role of accounting 
conservatism. LaFond and Watts [2008] posit that conservatism mitigates information asymmetry 
between managers and shareholders and limits managers’ ability to manipulate and overstate financial 
performance. They find that accounting conservatism increases in response to an increase in information 
asymmetry.  Francis and Martin [2010] and Srivastava and Tse [2009] find that acquisition profitability 
and the likelihood of early termination of unprofitable projects are increasing in timely loss recognition, 
respectively. These results are consistent with the idea that conservatism provides important information 
to shareholders that disciplines and constrains opportunistic managers’ incentive to engage in value-
destroying activities.  
 
 Overall, prior studies suggest that accounting conservatism plays an important informational and 
governance role in reducing debt contracting costs and mitigating manager-shareholder conflicts. Thus for 
firms that report conservatively, I expect debt and equity capital providers to be more willing to extend 
capital when needed, hence increasing firms’ financial flexibility. Based on the above discussion, I 
present my first hypothesis as follows: 
 
H1A: (“Efficient Contracting View”) Firms with greater financial reporting conservatism exhibit 
greater financial flexibility.  
 
 
7 
 
2.2 Accounting Conservatism and Financial Constraints: Distortion of Information View 
 An alternative view is that accounting conservatism is associated with lower financial flexibility. As 
discussed earlier, the consequence of reporting conservatism is the cumulative understatement of net 
assets in the balance sheet and more timely recognition of losses versus gains. When financial statements 
delay the recognition of good news relative to bad news, the book leverage ratio (debt-to-asset) of the 
firm is systematically overstated as compared to the true economic leverage, and net worth is 
systematically understated as compared to the true economic firm value. Both effects diminish credit 
standing and debt capacity and may thus reduce firms’ ability to raise capital in the future and decrease 
their financial flexibility. Furthermore, because net worth covenants are relatively common in debt 
contracts4 and violation of net worth covenants is the most frequent infringement that leads to technical 
defaults (Beneish and Press [1993]), the resulting understatement of net worth from reporting 
conservatism is detrimental to financial flexibility. This result is important to firms’ financial decisions in 
light of the strong emphasis that managers place on financial flexibility.5  
 
 In this reasoning, I posit that lenders do not undo the bias in conservative financial reporting at the 
time of debt contracting because conservatism facilitates their monitoring throughout the contract 
duration and increases the expected value of their financial claim.6 Alternatively, it may be too costly for 
lenders and borrowers to initiate and write contracts that adjust reported accounting numbers to reverse 
this bias completely.7 Finally, because of information problems within lending institutions, lenders prefer 
to contract on “hard information” (Stein [2002]), implying that lenders do not adjust the effects of 
reporting conservatism in audited financial statements completely.  
 
                                                          
4 For example, Li [2010] documents in his sample of private loan agreements from 1996-2005 that 45.2% of loans 
include net worth covenants. 
5 In a survey of finance managers’ debt financing decisions, Graham and Harvey [2001] document that financial 
flexibility is the most important factor driving firms’ choice of debt-equity ratios. 
6  Also, because of information asymmetry, the lending market may not be sufficiently perfect such that new lenders 
can reduce the bargaining power of existing lenders. 
7  One possible solution to satisfy lenders’ demand for conservatism is to include contract modifications (for 
example, via income escalators) instead of requiring firms’ commitment to report conservatively at the time of debt 
contracting. However, this may not be feasible since Beatty et al. [2008] document that contract modifications are 
not perfect substitutes for reporting conservatism in debt contracts. 
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 Moreover, reporting conservatism may create contracting inefficiencies that alter borrowers’ financial 
decisions. Guay and Verrecchia [2006] discuss how conservatism that recognizes bad news in a timely 
manner but good news in an untimely manner can create informational inefficiencies.8 Gigler et al. [2009] 
further demonstrate in their theoretical model that accounting conservatism, which increases the 
probability of a low signal in both good and bad states, can actually reduce the information content of bad 
reports and increase the probability of false alarms, both of which ultimately reduce the efficiency of debt 
contracts. As Roychowdhury [2010] highlights, conservatism may also lead to dysfunctional behavior if 
managers’ actions are based on the anticipated (negative) effect of conservatism on earnings and higher 
probability of future covenant violations.9 The above suggests that reporting conservatism that reduces 
financial flexibility may therefore affect firms’ financial decisions when managers behave in anticipation 
of the effect of conservatism on reported earnings.10 
 
 The above discussion does not require the assumption that firms are not behaving optimally. It is 
possible that firms trade off the benefits and costs of reporting conservatism in efficient contracting. By 
reporting conservatively, firms enjoy lower interest rates but they cede greater control to lenders and bear 
the costs of higher probability of covenant violations which decreases their financial flexibility. Based on 
the above discussion, I present my second hypothesis as follows: 
 
H1B: (“Distortion of Information View”) Firms with greater financial reporting conservatism exhibit 
lower financial flexibility.   
 
 
                                                          
8 In Guay and Verrecchia’s [2006] simple illustration, in a setting where there are three possible states of the world 
(bad, typical and good), conservative accounting reports bad news truthfully, but reports typical and good news as 
typical news, which results in information loss. 
9 The potential costs of covenant violations to both managers and the firm are renegotiation costs, interest rate 
increases, restriction on investments and financing, among others (Beneish and Press [1993]). Chava and Roberts 
[2008] also find that capital investment declines sharply following covenant violations, which provides 
corroborating evidence that covenant violations are indeed costly. 
10 Graham and Harvey [2001] document that earnings per share (EPS) dilution is the most important factor in 
managers’ decision to issue equity, which they interpret as ‘intriguing’ since the textbook view is that EPS is not 
diluted if the new equity earns the required rate of return. Bens et al. [2003] also find that firms repurchase stocks to 
manage diluted EPS associated with outstanding employee stock options. The above examples highlight the 
possibility that managers are fixated on reported numbers and base their decisions on them, even though reported 
numbers may not reflect firms’ true economic conditions. 
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2.3 Financial Flexibility and Firms’ Financial Decisions 
 Firms’ financial flexibility and their ability to access capital are difficult to measure empirically.11 
However, financial flexibility should manifest in firms’ financial decisions. My empirical strategy to test 
the two opposing predictions of conservatism’s relation with financial flexibility is to triangulate my 
findings by examining various corporate financial activities, namely, corporate liquidity management, 
decision to issue debt or equity, cash flow sensitivity of investments and payout decisions. The discussion 
of the relation between conservatism and these financial activities follows. 
 
2.3.1 Corporate liquidity management. The first financial decision I examine is corporate liquidity 
management. If capital markets are frictionless, firms always have access to financing for their positive 
NPV projects and there is little incentive for cash holdings beyond holding cash to minimize transaction 
costs associated with converting non-cash financial assets into cash for payments (Baumol [1952], Miller 
and Orr [1966]). However, when firms face uncertainty regarding future access to capital to fund their 
investments, they hold more cash for precautionary purposes (Opler et al. [1999]). Precautionary cash 
holdings are more valuable for financially constrained firms because they allow value-increasing 
investments to be made that might otherwise be bypassed due to lack of available resources (Denis and 
Sibilkov [2010]).  
 
 However, holding cash is not costless. Even though firms derive interest income from cash holdings, 
that is usually less than the interest expense saved from reducing debt. Also, there is an agency cost of 
free cash flow because entrenched managers derive benefits from retaining cash as it facilitates 
perquisites consumption and empire building (Jensen [1986]). Consistent with the agency cost 
explanation, Faulkender and Wang [2006] find that the average marginal value of a dollar of cash across 
all firms is only $0.94, and the value of cash holdings is even lower for firms with greater agency 
conflicts between managers and shareholders (Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith [2007], Pinkowitz et al. [2006]). 
Hence, precautionary cash holding is more desirable to the extent that firms anticipate future financing 
difficulty.  
 
 If reporting conservatism facilitates financial contracting, I expect firms with greater reporting 
conservatism to have better access to financing and to hold less precautionary cash (Efficient Contracting 
                                                          
11 For instance, firms with observed low levels of debt may imply either high financial flexibility due to low 
leverage, or imply low financial flexibility because these firms may want to obtain debt financing but are unable to 
do so.  
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View). Likewise, if reporting conservatism reduces financial flexibility, I expect firms with greater 
reporting conservatism to hold more cash (Distortion of Information View).12  
 
 Besides examining firms’ aggregate cash holding, I examine firms’ propensity to save cash from free 
cash flows. Almeida et al. [2004] posit that firms’ propensity to accumulate cash from cash inflows 
reflects the effect of financial constraints. They find that after controlling for other sources and competing 
uses of funds (e.g., capital expenditures, acquisitions and investment in working capital), firms with 
greater financial constraints are more likely to accumulate cash out of cash inflows in order to build up 
internal capital to finance future investment opportunities.13 Consistent with this conjecture, Campello et 
al. [2010] find that financially constrained firms built cash reserves as a buffer against potential credit 
supply shocks during the global financial crisis of 2008. Based on the Efficient Contracting View 
(Distortion of Information View), if accounting conservatism reduces (increases) financial frictions and 
hence increases (reduces) financial flexibility, I expect firms with greater financial reporting conservatism 
to have a lower (higher) propensity to save. 
 
2.3.2 Decision to issue debt or equity. The second financial decision I examine is the choice of debt or 
equity financing. If conservatism eases financial frictions, I expect conservative firms to raise capital 
through the debt market, given that issuing debt is less costly than equity.14,15 However, if conservatism 
understates net worth and increases financial constraints, I expect conservative firms to raise capital 
through the equity market in order to strengthen their balance sheet and to increase debt capacity.16 
                                                          
12 Note that the availability of credit lines is not able to fully alleviate this financial friction since credit lines may be 
conditionally reduced upon covenant violations (Sufi [2009]), where violations are also more likely for conservative 
firms (Zhang [2008]). 
13 In Almeida et al.’s [2004] model, the propensity to save for financially unconstrained firms is indeterminate since 
unconstrained firms are already investing at the first-best levels and their financial policy is only determined by the 
decision to pay a dividend either today or tomorrow, which has no implications on firm value (“irrelevance of 
liquidity”). 
14 Besides having higher front-end transaction costs, equity is more informationally sensitive compared to debt and 
therefore associated with greater security underpricing (Myers and Majluf [1984]). 
15 Ball et al. [2008] find that financial reporting conservatism is shaped by debt markets rather than equity markets. 
This suggests firms with greater conservatism are catering their financial reporting to debtholders’ demand, which 
implies that conservative firms are more likely to raise capital through the debt market. 
16 A possible question is why financially constrained firms would still issue equity if they could not obtain debt 
financing at a reasonable cost. To this point, Korajczyk and Levy [2003] find that financially constrained firms are 
not able to time their equity issuances during good macroeconomic conditions and may thus have to “take what they 
11 
 
Consistent with this reasoning, Kim and Weisbach [2008] find that firms’ decision to issue equity is 
partly driven by their desire to build up cash reserves, presumably in anticipation of future financing 
needs. Therefore, based on the Efficient Contracting View (Distortion of Information View), firms with 
greater financial reporting conservatism are more (less) likely to issue debt than equity.  
 
 According to the static trade-off theory of capital structure where firms balance the benefits of interest 
tax shields against the costs of financial distress, it is unclear whether financially unconstrained firms will 
necessarily choose to issue debt over equity, since financing choice is dependent on whether the firm is 
under or over-leveraged at the time of financing. In order to account for this trade-off, I explicitly control 
for firms’ deviation from a target leverage ratio in my empirical test examining the debt or equity 
issuance decision. 
 
2.3.3 Cash flow sensitivity of investments. The third financial attribute I examine is firms’ investment-
cash flow sensitivity.17 An extensive body of literature in economics and finance studies how financial 
frictions affect firms’ investment decisions. Theoretically, in perfect capital markets, firms invest until the 
marginal return on investment is equivalent to the cost of capital and adjustment costs (Hayashi [1982]). 
Hence, investments should vary only with profitable opportunities since firms are always able to fund 
their projects. When there are financial frictions and firms face funding constraints, investments also 
correlate with the availability of cash flows (Fazzari et al. [1988]). If reporting conservatism eases 
financial constraints and increases firms’ access to capital, then firms with greater reporting conservatism 
should experience lower investment-cash flow sensitivity (Efficient Contracting View). Conversely, if 
reporting conservatism reduces financial flexibility, firms with greater reporting conservatism should 
exhibit higher investment-cash flow sensitivity (Distortion of Information View). 
 
2.3.4 Payout decisions. The final financial decision I examine is firms’ payout policies. Following 
positive cash changes and after financing for investments, I expect firms with greater financial flexibility 
to have greater ability to increase their payout to shareholders, either via dividend or stock repurchase 
increases (DeAngelo et al. [2009], Harford et al. [2008]). Based on the Efficient Contracting View 
(Distortion of Information View), if reporting conservatism reflects greater (lower) financial flexibility, I 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
can get,” suggesting that constrained firms may have to raise equity regardless of timing and possibly when it is 
highly costly. 
17 I classify firms’ cash flow sensitivity of investments as a financial decision in this paper because firms’ ability to 
invest is ultimately affected by their ability to obtain capital, which is a financial decision. 
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expect dividend payouts/repurchase changes to be more (less) positively associated with prior cash 
changes for firms with greater reporting conservatism. 
 
3. Research Design 
3.1 Measure of Accounting Conservatism 
 My main measure of reporting conservatism is derived from Dichev and Tang [2008]. The authors 
propose a measure of reporting conservatism based on the matching of revenue with past, present and 
future expenses: 
 
 REVENUEt = α0 + α1*EXPt-1 + α2*EXPt + α3*EXPt+1 + εt                     (1)  
 
where EXP is expenses and is defined as revenue less earnings before extraordinary items, and all 
variables are scaled by average total assets. In this model, perfect matching of revenue with 
contemporaneous expenses for a profitable entity implies that α2 > 1 and both α1 and α3 equal 0. If 
financial reporting is conservative, expenses will be recognized before the associated revenue is 
recognized, and hence we should observe a positive relationship between past expenses and current 
revenue. Thus, I use α1 as my firm-year specific measure of reporting conservatism in this paper. This 
measure captures the understatement of net assets due to accounting methods and discretion because 
recognizing expenses before their associated revenue systematically understates net assets.  
 
 When choosing my empirical measure for reporting conservatism, the first priority is selecting one 
that corresponds with the hypotheses in this study. Depending on the specific hypothesis examined, prior 
work focuses on salient features of accounting conservatism such as the understatement of net assets 
and/or the asymmetric timeliness of losses versus gains recognition.18 For this study, and as highlighted in 
my hypothesis development, I focus on accounting conservatism that ultimately leads to the 
understatement of net worth, so I select a measure that reflects this attribute. My choice of measure for 
conservatism is also driven by the trade-off between: (a) a firm-year specific measure that is estimated 
using a time-series of prior-period observations; and (b) a cross-sectional specification that is estimated 
across all firms. Choosing the former provides a measure that captures some aspect of firm-year specific 
time-invariant practice of conservatism since it is estimated over a particular time window. Choosing the 
latter likely provides an estimate with a larger sample size that is less subject to a survivorship bias arising 
                                                          
18 Some prior work also differentiates between “conditional” and “unconditional” conservatism (e.g., Ball and 
Shivakumar [2005]). 
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from requiring long time-series data, but it assumes all firms in the cross-section have the same estimated 
coefficients in the conservatism model. For my main analyses and robustness tests, I use a firm-year 
specific measure because it is more consistent with my hypothesis that firms exhibit a level of reporting 
conservatism that does not change substantially over time. To support the robustness of my results, I also 
use a cross-sectional specification in additional sensitivity checks. 
 
 I estimate α1 (CONSVt) in equation (1) using the prior ten-year rolling window and interpret it to be 
increasing in the extent of reporting conservatism. The main benefit of this measure as compared to other 
firm-year specific asymmetric timeliness measures of conservatism is that it does not require a minimum 
number of “bad news” observations for estimation.19 Thus, this measure provides a minimal loss of 
observations and offers a more representative sample. A potential drawback of this measure is that it does 
not capture the differential timeliness of losses versus gains characteristic of much of other measures 
(e.g., the Basu [1997] measure). In additional analyses, I also test my hypothesis with a cross-sectional 
specification using the Basu [1997] model.20  
 
 A firm’s tendency to recognize expenses before its associated revenue is also a function of the firm’s 
business model. For example, a firm with a lean manufacturing business model (e.g., contract 
manufacturers) is less likely to recognize expenses early as compared to a firm that incurs expenses in 
anticipation of future demand (e.g., fashion and R&D intensive businesses). In order to account for the 
heterogeneity of my measure of conservatism that is driven by different business models, I include 
industry and time fixed-effects in my empirical tests. 
 
 Table 1 provides the results of the firm-year specific regression of equation (1). Panel A presents the 
statistics for the total sample and the statistics partitioned by decade. Consistent with results documented 
by Dichev and Tang [2008] and Givoly and Hayn [2000], there is a general trend of increasing reporting 
conservatism over time. α1 (or CONSV) which measures the extent to which expenses are recognized 
                                                          
19 Bad news observations are either fiscal years with negative returns (Basu [1997]), negative change in income, or 
negative cash flows from operations (Ball and Shivakumar [2005]). 
20 I do not estimate a firm-year specific measure of conservatism using the Basu [1997] model because Givoly et al. 
[2007] find that this firm-year specific estimation is unstable over time which is inconsistent with the notion that 
reporting conservatism is a reasonably consistent attribute.  I also do not consider a firm-year specific measure of 
conservatism suggested by Khan and Watts [2009] because their measure is a linear combination of the market-to-
book ratio, leverage and size, which are important determinants of financial activities as documented in the finance 
literature, and thus using the Khan and Watts [2009] measure may confound my analyses. 
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ahead of the associated revenue, increases from a mean of 0.02 in the 1970s to a mean of 0.09 in the 
2000s. 
 
 To provide some evidence of construct validity of this measure of conservatism, I compute the 
correlation between CONSV and accounting practices that are expected a priori to be associated with 
conservative reporting. In Table 1, Panel B, I find that CONSV is positively correlated with research and 
development expenses as a percentage of total assets (R&D, Pearson correlation = 0.14, p-value < 0.01) 
and the rate of depreciation for fixed assets (DEPRATE, Pearson correlation = 0.09, p-value < 0.01). 
Also, prior research (e.g., Beaver and Ryan [2000], Feltham and Ohlson [1995]) suggests that accounting 
conservatism is manifested in higher market-to-book ratio because equity values reflect expectations of 
future cash flows which are not reflected in book values that are understated as a result of reporting 
conservatism. Hence, I compute the correlation between CONSV and the market-to-book ratio (MB) and 
I find that it is positive (Pearson correlation = 0.12, p-value < 0.01) as predicted.21 
 
3.2 Empirical Models 
 Before discussing the empirical models used to test the hypothesis, it is important to recognize that 
the hypothesis in this paper implicitly assumes that accounting conservatism influences corporate 
financial decisions. It could also be the case that corporate financial decisions influence accounting 
conservatism. For example, corporate cash holdings may reflect firms’ ability to report conservatively or 
aggressively, and firms with greater financial resources are less likely to report conservatively since they 
are also less likely to access the capital markets for financing (reverse causality). To address this issue, I 
measure the firm-year specific level of conservatism one year prior to the financial variable for all my 
baseline regression specifications. I also address this concern in several other ways that are discussed in 
greater detail in section 6. 
 
3.2.1 Model of corporate liquidity management. To test my hypothesis, I first determine whether 
reporting conservatism is related to corporate cash holdings. I use a cash model similar to Bates et al. 
[2009] and regress corporate cash holding on its contemporaneous determinants and lagged measure of 
reporting conservatism: 
                                                          
21 While conceptually appealing, I do not use the market-to-book ratio as my measure of reporting conservatism 
because the market-to-book ratio also proxies for Tobin’s Q, which is an important determinant of financial 
decisions as widely documented in finance literature. However, I include a proxy for Tobin’s Q as a control variable 
in my regression equations. 
15 
 
 CASHt = α + βCONSVt-1 + ∑γCONTROLSt + εt              (2) 
 
Prior work examining cash holdings defines CASH as the sum of cash and cash equivalents scaled by 
total assets. Since reporting conservatism affects book values of both assets and equity, I define CASH as 
cash and cash equivalents scaled by market value of assets (MVA) to mitigate spurious correlation 
between my measure of cash holdings and conservatism due to the correlation between my choice of 
scalar and conservatism.22 I also scale all financial control variables by market value of assets to reduce 
heteroskedasticity. Because I conduct my hypothesis testing on a pooled sample, I adjust the standard 
errors to control for cross-sectional and time-series dependence (Gow et al. [2010], Petersen [2009]). 
 
 For CONTROLS, I select the book-to-market ratio (BM) and research and development expenditure 
(R&D) to proxy for investment opportunities because cash holdings are more beneficial for firms with 
valuable growth options (Opler et al. [1999]). I use firm size (SIZE) as a proxy for economies of scale 
associated with the transaction motive for holding cash (Baumol [1952], Miller and Orr [1966]). I also 
proxy for firm performance using cash flows (CF) and returns (RET) since firms with better performance 
are also more likely to accumulate cash (Bates et al. [2009]). Net working capital (NWC) is selected to 
control for assets that substitute for cash, and capital expenditure (CAPEX) and acquisition expenditure 
(ACQ) are chosen to proxy for cash outflows as well as asset tangibility. Firms with higher asset 
tangibility are expected to hold less precautionary cash since tangible assets can be used as collateral for 
future financing. I use financial leverage (LEVERAGE) to proxy for the tendency of high-leveraged firms 
to use cash to reduce debt, and cash flow volatility (CFVOL) and return volatility (RETVOL) to control 
for cash flow risk and other idiosyncratic risks which motivate precautionary cash holding (Bates et al. 
[2009]). I also include a dividend-paying firm dummy (DIVD) to account for the fact that dividend 
paying firms are likely to be less risky and hence have lower need for precautionary cash holdings. 
Finally, I include industry and year dummies as additional controls. Detailed descriptions of all variables 
used in this paper are included in Appendix A. 
 
 If accounting conservatism increases (decreases) financial flexibility and leads to better (worse) 
access to capital, I expect firms with greater reporting conservatism to hold less (more) cash, and hence I 
expect β < 0 (β > 0) in equation (2).  
 
                                                          
22 An implicit assumption in using market value instead of book value as a scalar is that the semi-strong efficient 
market impounds all publicly available information (including conservatism) in stock prices. 
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 In an alternative test of H1, I assess whether accounting conservatism is related to firms’ propensity 
to save, using a cash flow retention model similar to Almeida et al. [2004]: 
 
 ∆CASHt = α + ψFCFt + ζCONSVt-1 + βFCFt*CONSVt-1+ ∑γCONTROLSt + εt                 (3) 
 
where FCF is free cash flow and is defined as operating income before depreciation after interest, taxes 
and dividends, less other sources and (competing) uses of cash. The latter variables are capital 
expenditure (CAPEX), acquisition expenditure (ACQ), change in net working capital (∆NWC) and 
change in short-term debt (∆STDEBT). Finally, I include book-to-market (BM), firm size (SIZE), and 
industry and year dummies as additional control variables. Similar to equation (2), I also scale all 
financial variables by market value of assets. 
 
 If accounting conservatism increases (decreases) financial flexibility and leads to better (worse) 
access to capital, I expect firms with greater reporting conservatism are less (more) likely to save out of 
cash flows and hence I expect β < 0 (β > 0) in equation (3). 
 
3.2.2 Model of debt or equity issuance. I examine whether reporting conservatism is related to firms’ 
choice of debt versus equity issuance using the following financing model: 
 
 Pr(DISSUEt) = α + βCONSVt-1 + ψ(LEVERAGE*t – LEVERAGEt-1) + ∑γCONTROLSt + εt         (4) 
 
where DISSUE is an indicator variable which equals 1 if the firm issues debt, and 0 if it issues equity. To 
prevent misclassification of debt and equity issuance (for example, issuing equity for employee stock 
options plans), I follow prior work (e.g., Korajczyk and Levy [2003]) and test my hypothesis only on 
firms that either issue debt or equity greater than 5% of market value of assets.23 I discard observations 
where firms issue both debt and equity because their inclusion in my sample may lead to misclassification 
(6.4% of the sample of debt or equity issuances). 
 
 In this regression, I specifically control for the deviation from target leverage in the prior period 
(LEVERAGE*t-1 – LEVERAGEt-1) because firms that are under-leveraged (over-leveraged) are more 
likely to issue debt (equity). To estimate this deviation, I first regress firm leverage on its 
                                                          
23 Prior work uses 5% of total assets as the threshold. I use 5% of market value of assets because all my financial 
variables are scaled by market value of assets. 
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contemporaneous determinants (all financial variables scaled by market value of assets), which include 
proxies for asset tangibility (property, plant and equipment or PPE), performance (OI and RET), product 
uniqueness (BM and R&D), net operating losses carry-forward (NOL), size (SIZE), dividend-paying firm 
dummy (DIVD), operating income and return volatility (OIVOL and RETVOL), industry median 
leverage (ILEV), and industry and year dummies. Asset tangibility is included because tangible assets 
serve as collateral for debt financing and increase firms’ ability to carry debt. Firms with better 
performance and more unique products are also likely to have less debt (Titman and Wessels [1988]). Net 
operating losses carry-forward reduces future tax burden and thus reduces the benefit of interest tax 
shields and debt. Larger and dividend-paying firms are likely to have more debt as they are more 
diversified and stable and hence have lower probability of financial distress. Firms with volatile 
operations or facing higher idiosyncratic risks are less likely to rely on debt financing. Finally, firms tend 
to adjust their capital structure towards the industry median leverage (Hovakimian et al. [2001]). After 
estimating firm-year specific target leverage which is defined as the fitted value of the leverage regression 
(LEVERAGE*t-1), the difference between the target leverage and the actual leverage is the deviation from 
target leverage ratio (LEVERAGE*t-1 – LEVERAGEt-1). For control variables in equation (4), I 
specifically include stock returns (RET) to control for firms’ tendency to issue equity following stock 
price run-ups. I also include contemporaneous BM, R&D, SIZE, DIVD, PPE, OI, OIVOL, RETVOL, 
NOL, and industry and year dummies as additional controls.  
 
 If accounting conservatism increases (decreases) financial flexibility and leads to better (worse) 
access to capital, I expect firms with greater reporting conservatism are more likely to issue debt (equity). 
Therefore, I expect β > 0 (β < 0) in equation (4). 
 
3.3.3 Model of cash flow sensitivity of investments. Next, I estimate the following investment-cash flow 
sensitivity model: 
 
 CFSIt = α + βCONSVt-1 + ∑γCONTROLSt + εt                (5) 
 
where CFSI is a firm-year specific measure of cash flow sensitivity of investment (Hovakimian and 
Hovakimian [2009]). This measure is defined as the difference between the firm’s cash flow-weighted 
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time-series average investment and its unweighted arithmetic time-series average investment. 24  The 
intuition behind this specification is that a financially unconstrained firm’s investment is unaffected by 
the timing of its cash flows and hence the cash-flow weighted and unweighted average investment should 
be similar. I estimate this measure using the current and the prior nine years rolling window. 
 
 For CONTROLS, I include proxies for asset tangibility (PPE) since firms with higher asset collateral 
are better able to obtain financing and should have lower investment-cash flow sensitivity. I also control 
for firm performance (CF and RET) because better performing firms exhibit lower constraints to 
investments. Proxies for growth opportunities (BM and R&D) are included to control for investment 
opportunities. I include size (SIZE) and dividend-paying firm dummy (DIVD) since larger firms and 
dividend payers are more stable and face less investment constraints. Finally, I include leverage 
(LEVERAGE) and cash flow and return volatility (OIVOL and RETVOL) because firms with higher debt 
and higher cash flow and idiosyncratic risks are also likely to have higher investment-cash flow 
sensitivity. Consistent with earlier specifications, all financial variables are scaled by market value of 
assets, and I include industry and year dummies as additional controls. 
 
 If accounting conservatism increases (decreases) financial flexibility and leads to better (worse) 
access to capital, I expect firms with greater reporting conservatism exhibit lower (higher) investment-
cash flow sensitivity. Hence, I expect β < 0 (β > 0) in equation (5). 
 
3.2.4 Model of corporate payout decisions. Finally, I separately estimate the following regression for 
dividend changes and stock repurchase (PAYOUT) changes similar to Harford et al. [2008]: 
 
 ∆PAYOUTt+1 = α + ψ∆CASHt + ϕCASHt + ζCONSVt-1 + β∆CASHt*CONSVt-1 +  
            ∑γCONTROLSt + εt+1                                      (6) 
 
If accounting conservatism increases (decreases) financial flexibility and leads to better (worse) access to 
capital, I expect payout changes should be more (less) positively associated with prior cash changes. 
Therefore, I expect β > 0 (β < 0) in equation (6). 
                                                          
24 Specifically, CFSIit = ∑ (    
    
∑         
)    ∑    
 
        , where CF is income before extraordinary items 
and depreciation, I is capital expenditures, and both variables are scaled by beginning-of-period net property, plant 
and equipment. Following prior work (e.g., Biddle and Hilary [2006], Hovakimian and Hovakimian [2009]) and to 
avoid negative and extreme values, negative values are set to zero in this formula. 
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 For CONTROLS, I include all other control variables in cash regression equation (2) because 
determinants of cash holdings are likely to drive both cash changes and payout changes. All financial 
variables are also scaled by market value of assets. 
 
4. Data and Descriptive Statistics 
 I obtain my initial sample of firm-year observations from 1971 – 2007 from COMPUSTAT. I include 
firms that are incorporated in the US, listed in the US stock exchanges (EXCHG code between 11 and 
19), and with stock returns data from CRSP. I also exclude financials (SIC 6000-6999) and utilities (SIC 
4900-4999) because these regulated firms are likely distinctive in their financial and reporting activities. 
My main sample after data requirements consists of 43,598 firm-years (Table 2), and sample size varies 
across regression equations to conserve sample size. To mitigate the influence of outliers, I discard 
observations where the value of the continuous variables is lower (higher) than the 1% (99%) levels. 
 
 Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics for the main sample. The firms in my sample are generally 
larger than the COMPUSTAT universe in the corresponding sample period. The sample median of total 
assets is $201 million whereas the COMPUSTAT median of total assets is $86 million (untabulated). This 
size difference is due to my firm-year specific measurement of reporting conservatism (CONSV) that 
requires data from the prior 10 fiscal years. Therefore, my sample is composed of only larger firms that 
have survived at least 10 years. This is also reflected by the relatively large proportion of dividend-paying 
firms (60.6%) versus the COMPUSTAT universe of 38.2% (untabulated).  
 
 Table 3 presents the sample Pearson correlations among the main variables. The financial activity 
variables appear to be correlated with one another in a meaningful way. Firms that hold more cash are 
more likely to issue equity (DISSUE) and have higher investment-cash flow sensitivity (CFSI). Firms 
with higher investment-cash flow sensitivity (CFSI) are also more likely to issue equity and are less likely 
to increase dividends. However, because these are pairwise univariate correlations, I defer the main 
analyses to multivariate tests in section 5. 
 
5. Results 
5.1 Analyses Using Firm-year Specific Measure of Reporting Conservatism 
 Table 4 represents the association between reporting conservatism and corporate liquidity 
management. In Panel A, I find that firms with greater reporting conservatism hold more cash (coefficient 
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= 0.013, t-statistic = 2.72) which is consistent with H1B. One standard deviation increase in reporting 
conservatism is associated with a 2.7% increase in the unconditional mean corporate cash holdings.25 The 
other control variables are largely consistent with findings in prior literature that firms with more valuable 
investment opportunities (higher R&D) and higher cash flow risks (higher CFVOL) hold more cash, and 
firms with greater cash outflows (higher LEVERAGE, CAPEX, ACQ and NWC) and firms that are more 
stable (higher SIZE and dividend paying firms) hold less cash. However, I find that firms with higher BM 
also hold more cash, possibly because book-to-market also proxies for firm stability. Firms with higher 
CF appear to hold less cash, possibly because firms with higher and more stable cash flows are more 
likely to return cash to capital providers and hence hold less cash. Finally, I find that firms with higher 
idiosyncratic risks (high RETVOL) hold less cash, possibly because these risks are unanticipated and thus 
firms do not hold precautionary cash beyond that required to mitigate their firms’ own cash flow risks 
(CFOVOL). 
 
 In Panel B, I investigate whether reporting conservatism is associated with firms’ propensity to save. 
Consistent with H1B, I find that firms with higher reporting conservatism also save more cash out of cash 
flows (coefficient = 0.063, t-statistic = 1.82). One standard deviation increase in reporting conservatism is 
associated with a 4.3% increase in firms’ propensity to save. Overall, the results in Table 4 suggest that 
firms with higher reporting conservatism exhibit lower financial flexibility and thus hold more cash and 
accumulate more cash out of cash inflows, presumably in anticipation of future difficulty in their ability 
to access capital. 
 
 In Table 5, I examine whether reporting conservatism is associated with firms’ financing choice. 
Consistent with H1B, I find that firms with higher reporting conservatism are more likely to issue equity 
rather than debt (coefficient = -0.433, z-statistic = -2.17).26 One standard deviation increase in reporting 
conservatism is associated with an 8.1% decrease in the mean probability of debt issuance. To provide 
greater support that firms with greater reporting conservatism face less financial flexibility in their 
financing choice, I also examine whether firms with higher reporting conservatism are less likely to time 
their equity issuance after stock price run-up, since Korajczyk and Levy [2003] find that financially 
constrained firms are not able to time their equity issuance during favorable macroeconomic conditions. 
                                                          
25 Computed as 0.0126 (coefficient of CONSV) x 0.1586 (standard deviation of CONSV) ÷ 0.0736 (unconditional 
mean cash holdings). 
26 Inferences are unchanged when I use alternate thresholds 3% (coefficient = -0.372, z-statistic = -2.10) and 7% 
(coefficient = -0.349, z-statistic = -1.61) instead of 5% for classifying debt or equity issuance. 
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To test this prediction, I interact stock return performance (RET) with the measure of reporting 
conservatism (CONSV) and I find that firms with greater reporting conservatism are less likely to issue 
equity following a stock price run-up (coefficient = 0.988, z-statistic = 2.53). This result is consistent with 
my earlier finding that firms that exhibit greater reporting conservatism are likely to experience less 
flexibility in their choice of financing.  
 
 The other control variables are largely consistent with findings in prior literature. Firms that are 
under-leveraged (higher LEVDEV) and more stable (dividend-paying firms) are more likely to issue debt, 
and firms with greater investment opportunities (lower BM and higher R&D), higher stock price run-ups 
(higher RET), higher idiosyncratic risks (higher RETVOL) and higher tax shields (higher NOL) are more 
likely to issue equity.  
 
 Next, I examine whether reporting conservatism is related to firms’ investment-cash flow sensitivity. 
In Table 6, column 1, consistent with H1B, I find that firms with greater reporting conservatism also 
exhibit higher cash flow sensitivity of investments (coefficient = 0.061, t-statistic = 3.16). One standard 
deviation increase in reporting conservatism is associated with a 10.1% increase in the mean CFSI. 
Following Hovakimian and Hovakimian [2009], I also use a 0.05 threshold for CFSI as representing 
greater investment-cash flow sensitivity (CFSIDUM), and the result of the logit regression is positive and 
significant (coefficient = 0.991, z-statistic = 6.65). 27  To examine the conjecture that reporting 
conservatism may result in under-investment, I regress CAPEX on CONSV and other controls. Results in 
Table 6, column 3 suggest that reporting conservatism is associated with under-investment (coefficient = -
0.006, t-statistic = -3.15). This result corroborates Roychowdhury’s [2010] conjecture that reporting 
conservatism may lead to under-investment in positive NPV projects if managers anticipate the negative 
effect of conservatism on reported earnings. 
 
 The coefficients on the other control variables are also consistent with findings in prior literature. 
Firms that are larger and more stable (higher SIZE and dividend-paying firms), have higher asset 
tangibility (higher PPE), and better performing firms (higher OI and RET) face less constraints in 
investments, and firms that are highly leveraged (high LEVERAGE) and face greater operating 
uncertainty and idiosyncratic risks (higher OIVOL AND RETVOL) exhibit greater investment-cash flow 
sensitivity. 
                                                          
27 Results are also significant when I use thresholds of 0.03 and 0.01. 
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 Finally, I investigate the relation between reporting conservatism and payout decisions in Table 7, 
and I provide separate analysis for dividend and repurchase decisions. Firms with positive cash changes 
are more likely to increase dividends and repurchases, consistent with firms more likely to increase 
payouts to shareholders following an increase in liquidity. However, consistent with H1B, I find that 
firms with greater reporting conservatism have a smaller increase in dividends following positive cash 
changes (coefficient of ∆CASH*CONSV = -0.007, t-statistic = -3.46), which suggests that firms with 
greater conservatism likely face more constraints in their payout policies. Interestingly, I do not find the 
same result for stock repurchase changes (coefficient of ∆CASH*CONSV = 0.006, t-statistic = 0.32). 
Together, this suggests that firms with greater reporting conservatism are more reluctant to commit to a 
consistent higher payout policy via dividends and are more inclined to distribute excess cash via 
repurchases that requires less commitment for future payouts.  
 
 In sum, the earlier tests are consistent with the Distortion of Information View (H1B) and suggest that 
firms with greater reporting conservatism exhibit less financial flexibility in their corporate liquidity 
management, choice of financing, investment-cash flow sensitivity and payout policies.  
 
5.2 Analyses Using Cross-sectional Model of Reporting Conservatism 
 The analyses in the preceding section utilize a firm-year specific measure of reporting conservatism. I 
also confirm my results using cross-sectional reverse regression analyses on the pooled sample which is 
subject to less survivorship bias arising from requiring long time-series data to estimate CONSV. To do 
so, I augment the Dichev and Tang [2008] model to include interaction variables with future financial 
decision variables: 
 
 REVENUEt = β0 + β1*EXPt-1 + β2*EXPt + β3*EXPt+1 + β4*FIN + β5*EXPt-1*FIN + 
       β6*EXPt*FIN + β7*EXPt+1*FIN + εt                                                             (7) 
 
where FIN is either CASHt+1, ∆CASHt+1, DISSUEt+1, CFSIt+1 or ∆PAYOUTt+2, scaled by average total 
assets to be consistent with the Dichev and Tang [2008] model. The coefficient of interest is β5 where I 
examine whether reporting conservatism in time t is associated with financial decisions in time t+1 or t+2. 
Table 8 presents the results. 
 
 Relaxing the requirement for computing the firm-year specific measure of CONSV increases the 
usable sample size to 94,467 firm-years. As observed in Table 8, column 1, the coefficient of             
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EXPt-1*CASHt+1 is positive and significant (coefficient = 0.17, t-statistic = 3.28), suggesting that firms 
with greater reporting conservatism hold more cash which is consistent with H1B. In column 2, after 
controlling for FCF, the coefficient of EXPt-1*ΔCASHt+1 is positive but not significant (coefficient = 0.08, 
t-statistic = 1.19), which provides no statistical support for H1. Coefficients of EXPt-1*DISSUEt+1 
(coefficient = -0.17, t-statistic = -7.64) and EXPt-1*CFSIt+1 (coefficient = 0.02, t-statistic = 1.98) in 
columns 3 and 4 also provide evidence consistent with H1B, that firms with greater reporting 
conservatism are more likely to issue equity rather than debt and exhibit higher investment-cash flow 
sensitivity. In columns 5 and 6, I examine whether reporting conservatism is associated with future 
payout decisions and I find consistent evidence that firms with greater conservatism are associated with 
lower dividend changes (coefficient of EXPt-1*DIVDCHGt+2 = -1.64, t-statistic = -1.86) after controlling 
for CASH t+1 and ΔCASHt+1. However, these firms are associated with higher repurchase changes 
(coefficient of EXPt-1*REPURCHGt+2 = 0.21, t-statistic = 2.51), which suggests that firms with greater 
reporting conservatism substitute repurchase changes for dividend changes in distributing excess cash to 
shareholders, which presumably requires less commitment for future payouts. 
 
 Overall, the results in this section are consistent with the earlier finding that firms with greater 
reporting conservatism exhibit less flexibility in their financial decisions, in line with the Distortion of 
Information View (H1B). 
 
6. Additional Analyses and Sensitivity Checks 
6.1 Controlling for Potential Endogeneity in Firm-year specific Measure of Conservatism 
 As highlighted in section 3.2, this paper posits that reporting conservatism influences corporate 
financial decisions, but it could be the case that corporate financial decisions influence reporting 
conservatism. To address this issue, I reestimate my regressions using a 3-year and 5-year lagged value of 
CONSV. 28  Even though statistical significance becomes weaker in longer lagged values, the main 
inferences are mostly unchanged (untabulated).29 I also include firm fixed-effects that control for time-
invariant firm characteristics and assume that the endogeneity resulting from the reverse causality is 
                                                          
28  The reason for this procedure is to reduce the effect of reverse causality, given that lagged value of the 
conservatism measure is likely to be less influenced by the future value of the dependent variable. 
29 In particular, all tests remain statistically significant and consistent with H1B except for the analysis of propensity 
to save in which the CONSV coefficient retains the same sign but loses significance. 
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constant over time in additional sensitivity tests. 30  Although the coefficient of CONSV becomes 
insignificant when I examine its association with corporate propensity to save, the remaining tests are 
statistically similar (untabulated). Overall, the inferences are consistent with the results in the main 
analyses. 
 
6.2 Lead and Lag Analysis Using Cross-sectional Model of Reporting Conservatism 
 I recognize that firm fixed-effects may not be meaningful given that my measure of conservatism is 
estimated over the prior ten periods and there are overlapping windows in the estimation of the firm-year 
specific CONSV. To mitigate this concern, I conduct a lead and lag analysis using the cross-sectional 
model of reporting conservatism. If changes in conservatism precede changes in financial decisions, I 
should observe a relation between the change in conservatism and the lead dependent variable, but not the 
lagged dependent variable. Therefore, I estimate the following model analyzing cash and cash changes:31 
 
REVENUEt = β0 + β1*EXPt-1 + β2*EXPt + β3*EXPt+1 + β4*ΔCASHt+x +  
      β5*EXPt-1*ΔCASHt+x + β6*EXPt*ΔCASHt+x + β7*EXPt+1*ΔCASHt+x +  
      β8*CASHt-1+x + β9*EXPt-1*CASHt-1+x + β10*EXPt*CASHt-1+x + 
      β11*EXPt+1* CASHt-1+x + εt                         (8) 
 
 In this specification, I analyze over three successive time periods (x= -1, 0, 1) and I split the CASH 
variable into two components: CASH at the beginning of the period (time t-1+x) and the ΔCASH over the 
period (time t+x). Using this specification allows me to track how reporting conservatism is associated 
with change in cash holdings over successive time periods, after controlling for cash holdings. In 
untabulated analysis, I find that the coefficient of EXPt-1*ΔCASHt+x for x= -1, 0 and 1 is 0.022 (t-statistic 
= 0.32), 0.301 (t-statistic = 4.03), and 0.335 (t-statistic = 4.36), respectively. This suggests that reporting 
conservatism leads cash holdings rather than the reverse, providing support for the main results. 
 
 
 
                                                          
30 Firm fixed-effects are not included in the analysis of financing choice because 61.6% of the observations do not 
exhibit variation in debt-equity choice over time. 
31 In this analysis, I only examine cash holdings because they are uncontaminated by overlapping window unlike 
CFSI. In addition, it is not meaningful to analyze changes of change variables (ΔCASH and ΔPAYOUT). Finally, 
very few firms issue debt and equity in successive fiscal years so it is difficult to conduct lead-lag analysis. 
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6.3 Alternative Specification of CONSV 
 In measuring CONSV based on the Dichev and Tang [2008] model, I define reporting conservatism 
as the magnitude of the relation between current revenue and past expenses. Consistent with Dichev and 
Tang [2008], expenses include special items and exclude extraordinary items and discontinued operations. 
Given that special items may induce noise to this measurement, I exclude special items in expenses when 
I estimate the Dichev and Tang [2008] model to derive CONSV.32 The adjusted CONSV coefficient 
remains significant and consistent with H1B in the analyses of cash holdings, propensity to save, 
investment-cash flow sensitivity and payout decisions, whereas it retains the same sign but loses 
significance in the analyses of financing choice (untabulated). 
 
 Alternatively, instead of focusing solely on the relation between revenue and past expenses (α1) in my 
measure of CONSV, I include the relation between revenue and future expenses (α3) in my measure 
because α3 captures the firm’s tendency to defer recognition of expenses with its associated revenue (less 
conservative). Specifically, I redefine CONSV as α1 - α3 and rerun my tests. The redefined CONSV 
coefficient is statistically significant and consistent with the main results in all analyses except for the 
analysis of financing choice where it loses significance (untabulated). Overall, the main inferences are 
largely unchanged using these two alternative specifications of CONSV. 
 
6.4 Basu’s [1997] Model of Reporting Conservatism 
 As discussed earlier, my measure of reporting conservatism does not capture the differential 
timeliness of losses versus gains characteristic to the same extent as other measures. In an additional 
analysis, I also test my hypotheses with a cross-sectional reverse regression specification using the Basu 
[1997] model:  
 
 EARNINGSt = β0 + β1*NEGt + β2*RETt + β3*RETt*NEGt + β4*FIN + β5NEGt*FIN + 
          β6RETt*FIN + β7NEGt*RETt*FIN + ∑γCONTROLSt + εt                  (9) 
 
                                                          
32 On one hand, if special items expenses are incurred in anticipation of future revenue decreases, including them in 
expenses may attenuate my measure of α1. On the other hand, if special items expenses are incurred prior to future 
revenue increases (e.g. restructuring costs), including them may have the opposite effect on α1. I include special 
items in my measure of CONSV because: (a) firms incurring special items expenses ahead of associated revenue are 
consistent with my definition of reporting conservatism; (b) CONSV measured including special items has a higher 
correlation with various measures associated with conservative reporting (market-to-book ratio, R&D intensity and 
the rate of depreciation for fixed assets). 
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where FIN is either CASHt+1, ∆CASHt+1, DISSUEt+1, CFSIt+1 or ∆PAYOUTt+2, RETt is stock returns 
cumulated over the 12-month period ending 3 months after the fiscal year end, NEGt is an indicator 
equaling 1 if RETt is negative. I include BM, SIZE, LEVERAGE and an indicator variable for firm 
membership in high litigation risks industries and interact these variables with NEGt, RETt and 
NEGt*RETt, as common in the literature. I examine whether incremental timeliness for bad news 
recognition in time t is associated with financial decisions in time t+1 or t+2 (β7). The results for equation 
(9) are tabulated in Table 9. β7 retains the same sign and remains statistically significant in the analyses of 
cash holdings, propensity to save and choice of financing, whereas β7 is insignificant in the analyses of 
investment-cash flow sensitivity and payout policies. Overall, the results using the Basu [1997] model of 
reporting conservatism are largely consistent with my main results reported earlier.  
 
6.5 Controlling for Firm Governance 
 Roychowdhury [2010] posits that accounting policies including reporting conservatism are part of a 
system of good governance mechanisms and policies. Hence, it is likely that corporate governance 
influences both conservative reporting and financial decisions and my findings may be spurious. To 
address this issue, I control for firm governance using institutional ownership (IOHOLD, available from 
1979-2007), board independence (BD_IND, available from 1996-2007), and G-score (GSCORE, 
available from 1991-2007) individually in my analyses using firm-year specific measure of CONSV.33  In 
untabulated analyses, the coefficient of CONSV retains the same sign and is significant at 10% or better 
in all analyses including institutional ownership as a control.  The CONSV coefficient loses significance 
in the analyses of investment-cash flow sensitivity and dividend payouts including either board 
independence or G-score as controls. Finally, the CONSV coefficient changes sign and becomes 
significant in the analysis of dividend payouts using board independence as a control. This suggests that 
board governance relaxes financial constraints and ensures that managers of firms with greater reporting 
conservatism increase dividend payouts following positive cash changes.  
 
6.6 Managerial Risk Aversion 
 Throughout the paper, I examine and test whether reporting conservatism is associated with corporate 
financial activities. However, I cannot dismiss the possibility that managers are inherently risk-averse 
which affects both conservative reporting and financial decisions. To examine this possibility, I use 
CEO’s age, tenure and wealth (logged value of CEO’s share ownership) to proxy for risk aversion 
                                                          
33 I do not include all three controls at the same time because it results in a significant loss of firm-year observations 
from 43,598 to 5,507. 
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because CEOs who are older, have longer tenure or are wealthier are likely to be less risk averse. Data on 
these variables are available from fiscal year 1993. I include these variables individually as additional 
controls. In untabulated analyses, I find that the CONSV coefficient retains the same sign and remains 
statistically significant in the analyses of cash holdings, propensity to save, and choice of financing, while 
the CONSV coefficient loses significance in the analyses of investment-cash flow sensitivity and payout 
policies. I also find that CEOs who are older, have longer tenure and are wealthier hold more cash and 
have lower investment-cash flow sensitivity. Overall, even though I cannot completely reject this 
alternative story of managerial risk aversion due to imperfect proxies, most of the main inferences are 
unchanged using these proxies.    
 
7. Summary and Conclusion 
 In this paper, I examine whether reporting conservatism is associated with firms’ financial flexibility 
as manifested in their corporate financial decisions, namely with regard to their liquidity management, 
choice of debt or equity financing, investment-cash flow sensitivity, and payout policies. Using a measure 
of reporting conservatism derived from Dichev and Tang [2008], I find that firms with greater reporting 
conservatism exhibit less flexibility in their financial decisions. By understating net worth, accounting 
conservatism weakens the appearance of firms’ balance sheet strength which results in managers seeming 
more financially constrained and behaving more conservatively in their financial decisions. 
 
 This paper responds to a concern by Roychowdhury [2010, p.180] that evidence on conservatism’s 
effect on corporate decisions is lacking in the literature. This study extends our understanding of the 
relationship between accounting conservatism and corporate financial activities. Although reporting 
conservatism is beneficial to borrowers in terms of lower cost of debt, it also shifts more power to lenders 
by increasing the likelihood of covenant violations and lenders’ interventions (Zhang [2008]). This paper 
suggests that firms that report more conservatively behave as if debt contracting is more costly by 
exhibiting less financial flexibility in their internal financial decisions. This study draws attention to 
possible costs of reporting conservatism following theoretical work by Gigler et al. [2009], who find that 
reporting conservatism may reduce debt contracting efficiency. The results in this paper also provide 
some justification as to why standard setters prefer accounting information to be neutral and free of bias, 
and why they oppose including the concept of conservatism as a desirable qualitative characteristic of 
accounting information in the conceptual framework. 
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 A caveat in this paper is that I do not provide conclusive evidence of a causal link between reporting 
conservatism and firms’ financial activities. While I attempt to provide some evidence of a causal 
relationship through my empirical tests (e.g., lead and lag analysis), the results are insufficient to prove 
causality. Future research may utilize specific settings (e.g., exogenous shocks to reporting conservatism) 
to explore the causal relation between accounting conservatism and firms’ financial activities.  
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APPENDIX 
Variables Definition34  
ACQ Acquisition expenditure (AQC) for the fiscal year. 
BM The book-to-market ratio at the end of the fiscal year, defined as total assets (AT) divided 
by the sum of book value of debt (AT – CEQ) and market value of equity 
(CSHO*PRCC_F). 
CAPEX Capital expenditure (CAPEX) for the fiscal year. 
CASH Sum of cash and cash equivalents (CEQ) at the end of the fiscal year. 
CF Cash flow for the fiscal year, defined as operating income before depreciation (OIBDP) 
less interest expense (XINT) less tax expense (TXT) less dividends (DVC). 
CFSI ∑ (    
    
∑         
) -   ∑             , where CF is income before extraordinary items and 
depreciation (IB + DP), I is capital expenditures (CAPX), and both variables are scaled 
by beginning-of-period net property, plant and equipment (PPENT). To avoid negative 
and extreme values, negative values are set to zero in this formula 
CFVOL Volatility of cash flow, measured over at least 3 years in the prior ten fiscal years. 
CONSV Defined as α1 in the following firm-specific time series regression in the prior ten-year 
rolling window: 
 REVENUEt = α0 + α1*EXPt-1 + α2*EXPt + α3*EXPt+1 + εt 
DEBT Book value of debt at the end of the fiscal year, which is defined as the sum of long-term 
debt (DLTT) and debt in current liabilities (DLC). 
DISSUE Indicator equals one if the firm issues net debt (∆DEBT) greater than 5% of market value 
of assets, and zero if the firm issues net equity (SSTK – PRSTKC - ∆PSTKL) greater 
than 5% of market value of assets, in the fiscal year. 
DIVD Indictor equals one if the firm is a dividend payer (DVC > 0) in the fiscal year, zero 
otherwise. 
                                                          
34 COMPUSTAT variables in parentheses, unless otherwise noted. 
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DIVDCHG Change in dividends (DVC) over the fiscal year. 
FCF Free cash flow in the fiscal year, defined as operating income before depreciation 
(OIBDP) less interest expense (XINT), less tax expense (TXT) less dividends (DVC) less 
capital expenditure (CAPEX) less acquisition expenditure (AQC) less change in net 
working capital (WCAP – CHE) less change in short-term debt (DD1).  
LEVDEV Deviation from target leverage in the prior fiscal year (LEVERAGEt-1* less  
LEVERAGEt-1). 
LEVERAGE Sum of long-term debt (DLTT) and debt in current liabilities (DLC) at the end of the 
fiscal year. 
MVA Market value of assets, defined as the sum of book value of debt (AT – CEQ) and market 
value of equity (CSHO*PRCC_F) at the end of the fiscal year. 
NOL Net operating loss carry-forward (TLCF) at the end of the fiscal year. 
NWC Net working capital at the end of the fiscal year, defined as working capital (WCAP) less 
cash (CHE). 
OI Operating income before depreciation (OIBDP) in the fiscal year. 
OIVOL Volatility of operating income before depreciation (OIBDP), measured over at least 3 
years in the prior ten fiscal years.  
PPE Gross property, plant and equipment (PPEGT) at the end of the fiscal year. 
REPURCHG Change in net repurchases in the fiscal year. Following Fama and French [2001], if the 
firm uses the ‘treasury method’, net repurchases are defined as the increase in treasury 
stock (TSTKC). If the firm uses the ‘retirement method’ (inferred from zero treasury 
stock in the prior and current year), net repurchases are defined as the difference between 
stock purchases (PRSTKC) and stock issuances (SSTK). Net repurchases are set to zero 
if negative. 
R&D Research and development expenditure (XRD) in the fiscal year. This variable is set to 
zero if missing. 
RET Value-weighted 12-month market-adjusted returns in the fiscal year (CRSP: VWRETD). 
34 
 
RETVOL 12-month returns volatility in the fiscal year. 
SIZE Logarithm of market value of assets (AT – CEQ + CSHO*PRCC_F) in the fiscal year, 
adjusted for inflation using Table B-3 from the Economic Report to the President. 
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Table 1 
Firm-specific Regression of Revenue on Past, Current and Future Expenses 
 
REVENUEt = α0 + α1*EXPt-1 + α2*EXPt + α3*EXPt+1 + εt                                             (1) 
 
 
CONST 
 
α1 
 
α2 
 
α3 
 Panel A: Total sample (43,598 firm-year observations) 
Mean -0.05 
 
0.06 
 
1.01 
 
0.00 
 (t-statistic) (-36.55) 
 
(74.10) 
 
(912.45) 
 
(-5.88) 
 Q1 -0.17 
 
-0.03 
 
0.97 
 
-0.07 
 Median -0.03 
 
0.03 
 
1.04 
 
-0.01 
 Q3 0.08 
 
0.11 
 
1.12 
 
0.06 
 Std. Dev. 0.29 
 
0.16 
 
0.23 
 
0.17 
          
1970s sample (8,442 firm-year observations) 
Mean -0.05 
 
0.02 
 
1.07 
 
-0.01 
 Q1 -0.14 
 
-0.03 
 
1.02 
 
-0.05 
 Median -0.03 
 
0.01 
 
1.06 
 
-0.01 
 Q3 0.06 
 
0.05 
 
1.12 
 
0.03 
 1980s sample (12,764 firm-year observations) 
Mean -0.06 
 
0.03 
 
1.06 
 
-0.01 
 Q1 -0.16 
 
-0.03 
 
1.00 
 
-0.07 
 Median -0.04 
 
0.02 
 
1.06 
 
-0.01 
 Q3 0.07 
 
0.08 
 
1.13 
 
0.05 
 1990s sample (12,415 firm-year observations) 
Mean -0.05 
 
0.08 
 
0.98 
 
0.00 
 Q1 -0.19 
 
-0.02 
 
0.92 
 
-0.09 
 Median -0.03 
 
0.04 
 
1.03 
 
-0.01 
 Q3 0.10 
 
0.15 
 
1.11 
 
0.07 
 2000s sample (9,977 firm-year observations) 
Mean -0.05 
 
0.09 
 
0.95 
 
0.00 
 Q1 -0.18 
 
-0.02 
 
0.84 
 
-0.09 
 Median -0.03 
 
0.05 
 
1.01 
 
0.00 
 Q3 0.10 
 
0.18 
 
1.11 
 
0.09 
           
Panel B: Pearson correlation table 
 
CONSV 
 
R&D 
 
DRATE 
 
MB 
 CONSV 1.00 
       R&D 0.14 
 
1.00 
     DEPRATE 0.09 
 
0.25 
 
1.00 
   MB 0.12 
 
0.32 
 
0.20 
 
1.00 
 The sample consists of 43,598 US-incorporated firm-years from 1971 – 2007 and excluding financials (SIC 6000-
6999) and utilities (SIC 4900-4999). REVENUE is net sales (SALE). EXP is expenses, defined as REVENUE less 
income before extraordinary items (IB). R&D is research and development (XRD) scaled by total assets (AT). 
DEPRATE is depreciation expense (DP) divided by gross property, plant and equipment (PPEGT). MB is the 
market-to-book ratio. All variables in (1) are scaled by average total assets (AT). The t-statistics reported in Panel A 
are determined based on the distribution of the 43,598 coefficients obtained from the firm-specific regressions.  
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Table 2 
Sample and Descriptive Statistics 
 
       Variables Obs. Mean Median Std. Dev. Q1 Q3 
CASH 43,598 0.074 0.044 0.086 0.018 0.097 
∆CASH 43,598 0.003 0.001 0.049 -0.012 0.019 
DISSUE 8,911 0.844 1.000 0.363 1.000 1.000 
CFSI 41,212 0.095 0.018 0.320 0.004 0.058 
DIVDCHG 42,648 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.001 
REPURCHG 28,443 0.008 0.000 0.023 0.000 0.004 
CONSV 43,598 0.056 0.026 0.159 -0.027 0.111 
BM 43,598 0.816 0.817 0.302 0.597 1.027 
R&D 43,598 0.015 0.000 0.028 0.000 0.020 
SIZE 43,598 1.509 1.435 1.874 0.117 2.866 
DIVD 43,598 0.606 1.000 0.489 0.000 1.000 
LEVERAGE 43,598 0.204 0.177 0.162 0.069 0.309 
LEVDEV 42,480 -0.002 0.008 0.119 -0.074 0.077 
CAPEX 43,598 0.052 0.039 0.044 0.021 0.069 
PPE 43,598 0.505 0.433 0.342 0.243 0.696 
FCF 43,598 -0.022 -0.011 0.080 -0.056 0.022 
OI 43,598 0.099 0.102 0.072 0.068 0.140 
CF 43,598 0.047 0.053 0.055 0.031 0.075 
RET 43,598 0.174 0.160 0.429 -0.078 0.403 
OIVOL 43,598 0.046 0.038 0.032 0.024 0.058 
CFVOL 43,598 0.033 0.024 0.030 0.015 0.040 
RETVOL 43,598 0.118 0.103 0.061 0.076 0.142 
ACQ 43,598 0.011 0.000 0.030 0.000 0.003 
NWC 43,598 0.153 0.122 0.171 0.029 0.255 
NOL 43,494 0.044 0.000 0.164 0.000 0.000 
              
The sample consists of 43,598 US-incorporated firm-years from 1971 – 2007 and excluding financials (SIC 6000-
6999) and utilities (SIC 4900-4999). CASH is the sum of cash and cash equivalents. ∆CASH is the change in 
CASH. DISSUE is an indicator equals one if the firm issues net debt greater than 5% of market value of assets, and 
zero if the firm issues net equity greater than 5% of market value of assets. CFSI is the cash flow sensitivity of 
investment, defined according to Hovakimian and Hovakimian [2009]. DIVDCHG is the change in dividends. 
REPURCHG is the change in net repurchases. CONSV is the firm-year measure of reporting conservatism. BM is 
the book-to-market ratio. R&D is research and development expenditure. SIZE is logarithm of market value of 
assets adjusted for inflation. DIVD is an indicator equals one if the firm is a dividend payer, and zero otherwise. 
LEVERAGE is the sum of long-term debt and debt in current liabilities. LEVDEV is the deviation from target 
leverage in the prior period (LEVERAGE* - LEVERAGE). CAPEX is capital expenditure. PPE is gross property, 
plant and equipment.  FCF is free cash flow. OI is operating income before depreciation. CF is cash flow. RET is the 
value-weighted 12-month market-adjusted returns in the fiscal year. OIVOL is the volatility of operating income 
before depreciation, measured over at least 3 years in the prior ten fiscal years. CFVOL is the volatility of cash flow, 
measured over at least 3 years in the prior ten fiscal years. RETVOL is 12-month returns volatility in the fiscal year. 
ACQ is acquisition expenditure. NWC is net working capital. NOL is net operating loss carry-forward. All financial 
variables are also scaled by market value of assets. 
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Table 3 
Pearson Correlation Table 
 
The sample consists of 43,598 US-incorporated firm-years from 1971 – 2007 and excluding financials (SIC 6000-6999) and utilities (SIC 4900-4999). All 
variables are defined in the Appendix. All correlations are statistically significant at the 0.05 level or better, except those highlighted. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25
1 CASH 1.00
2 ∆CASH 0.23 1.00
3 DISSUE -0.17 -0.20 1.00
4 CFSI 0.06 -0.02 -0.10 1.00
5 DIVDCHG 0.02 0.07 -0.07 -0.02 1.00
6 REPURCHG 0.07 0.10 -0.50 0.03 0.02 1.00
7 CONSV 0.06 -0.01 -0.11 0.10 -0.03 0.01 1.00
8 BM 0.11 -0.05 0.31 -0.06 -0.07 -0.06 -0.12 1.00
9 R&D 0.19 -0.07 -0.10 0.09 -0.03 0.02 0.10 -0.02 1.00
10 SIZE -0.22 0.04 0.06 -0.17 0.07 0.02 -0.06 -0.29 -0.14 1.00
11 DIVD -0.09 0.02 0.20 -0.24 0.03 -0.03 -0.18 0.04 -0.18 0.35 1.00
12 LEVERAGE -0.26 -0.06 0.36 0.01 -0.10 -0.09 -0.05 0.51 -0.15 -0.05 -0.11 1.00
13 LEVDEV 0.25 0.00 0.13 -0.05 0.06 0.02 -0.01 -0.07 0.00 0.08 0.09 -0.68 1.00
14 CAPEX -0.11 -0.09 0.17 -0.08 -0.01 -0.02 -0.09 0.32 -0.08 0.04 0.15 0.24 0.04 1.00
15 PPE -0.08 -0.05 0.16 -0.12 -0.05 -0.05 -0.06 0.58 -0.11 -0.05 0.11 0.37 -0.01 0.57 1.00
16 FCF 0.09 0.38 -0.08 -0.05 0.04 -0.03 0.00 -0.07 -0.03 0.03 0.02 -0.17 0.01 -0.31 -0.06 1.00
17 OI -0.09 0.15 0.19 -0.19 0.18 -0.01 -0.16 0.27 -0.23 0.11 0.37 0.06 0.03 0.33 0.28 0.23 1.00
18 CF -0.11 0.16 0.15 -0.16 0.13 0.00 -0.10 0.14 -0.18 0.12 0.21 -0.04 0.07 0.30 0.25 0.32 0.87 1.00
19 RET -0.03 0.16 -0.18 0.01 0.12 0.03 0.01 -0.27 -0.09 0.02 0.00 -0.19 0.01 -0.12 -0.15 0.11 0.10 0.13 1.00
20 OIVOL 0.20 -0.02 -0.12 0.22 -0.02 0.02 0.11 0.11 0.14 -0.48 -0.28 -0.01 0.00 0.02 0.03 -0.10 -0.14 -0.16 0.07 1.00
21 CFVOL 0.17 -0.03 -0.17 0.25 -0.05 0.02 0.19 -0.01 0.16 -0.40 -0.39 -0.01 -0.05 -0.05 -0.03 -0.10 -0.26 -0.23 0.05 0.81 1.00
22 RETVOL 0.05 0.00 -0.22 0.20 -0.06 0.00 0.12 -0.01 0.16 -0.34 -0.43 0.11 -0.14 -0.09 -0.08 -0.06 -0.26 -0.22 0.24 0.30 0.33 1.00
23 ACQ -0.08 -0.11 0.13 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 -0.03 -0.03 0.10 0.01 0.05 0.01 -0.08 -0.10 -0.37 -0.01 0.02 -0.01 -0.05 -0.02 -0.05 1.00
24 NWC -0.06 -0.06 0.13 -0.04 0.00 -0.02 -0.11 0.52 0.09 -0.34 0.08 0.12 -0.01 -0.06 0.01 -0.03 0.24 0.14 -0.07 0.10 -0.04 -0.02 -0.07 1.00
25 NOL 0.05 -0.07 -0.15 0.15 -0.03 0.00 0.14 -0.03 0.15 -0.19 -0.28 0.06 -0.07 -0.10 -0.03 -0.08 -0.31 -0.31 -0.06 0.27 0.35 0.26 -0.03 -0.09 1.00
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Table 4 
Reporting Conservatism and Corporate Liquidity Management 
 
Panel A: Cash Model 
 
CASHt = α + βCONSVt-1 + ∑γCONTROLSt + εt                                                               (2) 
 
 
CASH 
  
 
Coef. t-stats 
   CONSV 0.013 2.72 *** 
  BM 0.157 26.37 *** 
  R&D 0.333 5.28 *** 
  SIZE -0.007 -9.43 *** 
  DIVD -0.002 -0.86 
   LEVERAGE -0.233 -23.47 *** 
  CAPEX -0.335 -17.13 *** 
  CF -0.077 -4.73 *** 
  RET 0.003 1.53 
   CFVOL 0.184 5.31 *** 
  RETVOL -0.071 -4.24 *** 
  ACQ -0.147 -8.74 *** 
  NWC -0.201 -22.61 *** 
  CONSTANT 0.045 4.14 *** 
  
      Industry and Year FE YES 
    Adjusted R2 0.313 
    Observations 43,598 
     Panel B: Cash Retention Model 
 
∆CASHt = α + ψFCFt + ζCONSVt-1 + βFCFt*CONSVt-1+ ∑γCONTROLSt + εt                       (3) 
 
 
∆CASH 
  
 
Coef. t-stats 
   CONSV 0.000 0.30 
   FCF*CONSV 0.063 1.82 * 
  FCF 0.234 27.46 *** 
  BM -0.009 -8.83 *** 
  SIZE 0.000 1.68 * 
  CONSTANT 0.019 3.52 *** 
  
      Industry and Year FE YES 
    Adjusted R2 0.159 
    Observations 43,598 
    All variables are defined in the Appendix, and financial variables are scaled by market value of assets. 
Standard errors are corrected for cross-sectional and time-series dependence (Gow et al. [2010], 
Petersen [2009]). ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 level or 
better, respectively (two-tailed test).  
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Table 5 
Reporting Conservatism and the Choice of Debt or Equity Financing 
 
Pr(DISSUEt) = α + βCONSVt-1 + ψLEVDEVt + ∑γCONTROLSt + εt                                       (4) 
 
 
(1) 
 
(2) 
  
 
DISSUE 
 
DISSUE 
  
 
Coef. z-stats 
  
Coef. z-stats 
   CONSV -0.433 -2.17 ** 
 
-0.645 -3.10 *** 
  RET*CONSV 
    
0.988 2.53 ** 
  BM 3.440 12.07 *** 
 
3.421 12.10 *** 
  R&D -4.292 -2.85 *** 
 
-4.122 -2.68 *** 
  SIZE 0.008 0.23 
  
0.004 0.12 
   DIVD 0.576 7.29 *** 
 
0.581 7.27 *** 
  LEVDEV 3.568 9.74 *** 
 
3.595 9.89 *** 
  PPE -0.470 -2.10 ** 
 
-0.465 -2.09 ** 
  OI -0.872 -0.89 
  
-0.867 -0.89 
   RET -0.326 -3.21 *** 
 
-0.419 -3.63 *** 
  OIVOL 0.579 0.45 
  
0.550 0.43 
   RETVOL -3.868 -5.87 *** 
 
-3.910 -6.04 *** 
  NOL -0.741 -4.43 *** 
 
-0.735 -4.48 *** 
  CONSTANT -1.850 -2.18 ** 
 
-1.815 -2.15 ** 
  
          Industry and Year FE YES 
   
YES 
    McFadden's R2 0.230 
   
0.231 
    Observations 8,560    
  
8,560 
    All variables are defined in the Appendix, and financial variables are scaled by market value of assets. 
Standard errors are corrected for cross-sectional and time-series dependence (Gow et al. [2010], Petersen 
[2009]). ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 level or better, respectively 
(two-tailed test).  
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Table 6 
Reporting Conservatism and Investment-Cash Flow Sensitivity 
  CFSIt = α + βCONSVt-1 + ∑γCONTROLSt + εt                                                               (5) 
 
 
(1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
 
CFSI 
 
CFSIDUM 
 
CAPEX 
 
Coef. t-stats 
  
Coef. z-stats 
  
Coef. t-stats 
 CONSV 0.061 3.16 *** 
 
0.991 6.65 *** 
 
-0.006 -3.15 *** 
BM -0.039 -2.22 ** 
 
-0.044 -0.28 
  
-0.011 -5.09 *** 
R&D -0.025 -0.18 
  
1.933 1.61 
  
0.095 7.34 *** 
SIZE -0.009 -3.79 *** 
 
-0.148 -7.00 *** 
 
0.001 3.80 *** 
DIVD -0.066 -9.46 *** 
 
-0.967 -15.25 *** 
 
0.001 0.76 
 LEVERAGE 0.093 3.55 *** 
 
0.781 3.18 *** 
 
0.009 2.57 ** 
PPE -0.089 -7.43 *** 
 
-0.997 -7.74 *** 
 
0.058 22.54 *** 
OI -0.240 -5.08 *** 
 
-0.895 -2.61 *** 
 
0.096 18.16 *** 
RET -0.024 -4.71 *** 
 
-0.171 -3.95 *** 
 
-0.010 -10.77 *** 
OIVOL 1.562 9.83 *** 
 
9.645 9.33 *** 
 
0.044 3.41 *** 
RETVOL 0.394 7.24 *** 
 
3.959 12.04 *** 
 
0.014 2.91 *** 
CONSTANT 0.101 4.83 *** 
 
-2.008 -3.27 *** 
 
0.007 1.49 
 
            Industry and 
Year FE YES 
   
YES 
   
YES 
  Adj. R2 
/McFadden's R2 0.113 
   
0.202 
   
0.454 
  Observations 41,212    
  
41,199 
   
43,598 
  CFSIDUM is an indicator equals to one if CFSI > 0.05, and zero otherwise. All other variables are defined in 
Appendix A, and financial variables are scaled by market value of assets. Standard errors are corrected for 
cross-sectional and time-series dependence (Gow et al. [2010], Petersen [2009]). ***, **, and * indicate 
statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 level or better, respectively (two-tailed test).  
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Table 7 
Reporting Conservatism and Payout Decisions 
 
∆PAYOUTt+1 = α + ψ∆CASHt + ϕCASHt + ζCONSVt-1 + β∆CASHt*CONSVt-1 +  
                        ∑γCONTROLSt + εt+1                                                                      (6) 
 
 
(1) 
 
(2) 
 
 
DIVDCHG 
 
REPURCHG 
 
 
Coef. t-stats 
  
Coef. t-stats 
  ∆CASH 0.002 4.77 *** 
 
0.045 7.48 *** 
 CASH 0.001 4.32 *** 
 
0.009 3.26 *** 
 CONSV -0.000 -1.69 * 
 
0.000 0.02 
  ∆CASH*CONSV -0.007 -3.46 *** 
 
0.006 0.32 
  BM -0.001 -7.38 *** 
 
0.000 -0.41 
  R&D -0.001 -1.51 
  
0.003 0.42 
  SIZE 0.000 4.22 *** 
 
0.001 3.86 *** 
 DIVD -0.001 -5.88 *** 
 
-0.002 -5.44 *** 
 LEVERAGE -0.002 -6.64 *** 
 
-0.013 -8.67 *** 
 CAPEX -0.001 -2.33 ** 
 
0.010 1.85 * 
 CF 0.006 6.55 *** 
 
-0.011 -1.98 ** 
 RET 0.001 5.59 *** 
 
0.000 0.10 
  CFVOL 0.000 0.32 
  
0.012 1.80 * 
 RETVOL -0.003 -5.08 *** 
 
0.002 0.64 
  ACQ 0.002 3.82 *** 
 
0.029 5.04 *** 
 NWC 0.000 -0.37 
  
0.004 2.63 *** 
 CONSTANT 0.001 2.54 ** 
 
0.005 1.61 
  
         Industry and Year FE YES 
   
YES 
   Adjusted R2 0.090 
   
0.029 
   Observations 42,648 
   
28,443 
   ∆PAYOUT refers to either dividend changes (DIVDCHG) or net repurchase changes (REPURCHG). All 
other variables are defined in the Appendix, and financial variables are scaled by market value of assets. 
Standard errors are corrected for cross-sectional and time-series dependence (Gow et al. [2010], Petersen 
[2009]). ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 level or better, respectively 
(two-tailed test).  
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Table 8 
Cross-sectional Tests of the Association between Reporting Conservatism and Financial Decisions 
 
REVENUEt = β0 + β1*EXPt-1 + β2*EXPt + β3*EXPt+1 + β4*FIN + β5*EXPt-1*FIN + β6*EXPt*FIN + β7*EXPt+1*FIN + εt                                                                                            (7) 
 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  
 FIN=CASHt+1  FIN=∆CASHt+1  FIN=DISSUEt+1  FIN=CFSIt+1  FIN=DIVDCHGt+2  FIN=REPURCHGt+2  
 REVENUEt  REVENUEt  REVENUEt  REVENUEt  REVENUEt  REVENUEt  
                   
EXPt-1  0.08 7.66 *** 0.07 7.82 *** 0.21 9.77 *** 0.07 7.46 *** 0.08 8.25 *** 0.09 11.25 *** 
EXPt  0.96 80.74 *** 0.96 57.79 *** 0.76 18.21 *** 0.96 81.69 *** 0.96 72.86 *** 0.95 62.56 *** 
EXPt+1  -0.03 -5.92 *** -0.02 -1.75 * 0.04 1.42  -0.02 -4.28 *** -0.03 -4.47 *** -0.04 -3.90 *** 
FINt+1  -0.21 -8.64 *** 0.09 2.04 ** 0.16 14.13 *** -0.05 -7.52 *** 3.65 8.86 *** -0.23 -5.15 *** 
EXPt-1*FIN 0.17 3.28 *** 0.08 1.19  -0.17 -7.64 *** 0.02 1.98 ** -1.64 -1.86 * 0.21 2.51 ** 
EXPt*FIN -0.29 -3.66 *** -0.17 -1.18  0.26 5.98 *** -0.03 -1.91 * 1.07 0.83  -0.20 -1.49  
EXPt+1*FIN 0.18 3.54 *** 0.02 0.22  -0.10 -3.16 *** 0.02 1.52  0.70 0.91  -0.03 -0.33  
FCFt+1    0.36 14.58 ***             
EXPt-1*FCFt+1    -0.22 -6.95 ***             
EXPt*FCFt+1    0.32 7.37 ***             
EXPt+1*FCFt+1    -0.06 -1.94 *             
CASHt+1              -0.22 -9.99 *** -0.14 -6.31 *** 
EXPt-1*CASHt+1             0.20 3.84 *** 0.13 2.33 ** 
EXPt*CASHt+1             -0.44 -3.41 *** -0.42 -3.10 *** 
EXPt+1*CASHt+1             0.24 2.95 *** 0.29 3.37 *** 
∆CASHt+1             0.30 6.89 *** 0.31 6.84 *** 
EXPt-1*∆CASHt+1             -0.05 -0.66  -0.03 -0.37  
EXPt*∆CASHt+1             0.06 0.29  0.16 0.73  
EXPt+1*∆CASHt+1             0.01 0.07  -0.10 -0.81  
CONSTANTt 0.02 4.01 *** 0.02 3.71 *** -0.14 -11.70 *** 0.03 7.09 *** 0.02 4.76 *** 0.02 4.37 *** 
Adjusted R2 0.956   0.962   0.952   0.977   0.957   0.956   
Observations 94,467   94,467   22,569   53,321   92,688   60,799   
All variables are defined in the Appendix, and financial variables are scaled by average total assets.. Standard errors are corrected for cross-sectional and time-series dependence (Gow et al. 
[2010], Petersen [2009]). ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 level or better, respectively (two-tailed test). 
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Table 9 
Cross-sectional Tests of the Association between Reporting Conservatism and Financial Decisions using Basu (1997) Model 
 
EARNINGSt = β0 + β1*NEGt + β2*RETt + β3*RETt*NEGt + β4*FIN + β5NEGt*FIN + β6RETt*FIN + β7NEGt*RETt*FIN + ∑γCONTROLSt + εt                     (9) 
 
 
(1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
 
(4) 
 
(5) 
 
(6) 
 
 
FIN=CASHt+1 
 
FIN=∆CASHt+1 
 
FIN=DISSUEt+1 
 
FIN=CFSIt+1 
 
FIN=DIVDCHGt+2 
 
FIN=REPURCHGt+2 
 
 
EARNINGt 
 
EARNINGt 
 
EARNINGt 
 
EARNINGt 
 
EARNINGt 
 
EARNINGt 
 NEGt -0.01 -0.85 
 
-0.01 -1.02 
 
-0.03 -1.82 * 0.00 0.33 
 
-0.01 -0.70 
 
-0.01 -1.18 
 RETt -0.01 -1.32 
 
-0.01 -0.59 
 
0.01 0.32 
 
-0.01 -0.84 
 
-0.01 -1.40 
 
-0.02 -3.12 *** 
NEGt*RETt 0.27 6.65 *** 0.25 5.74 *** 0.31 6.43 *** 0.29 5.80 *** 0.27 6.54 *** 0.27 7.06 *** 
FIN -0.09 -3.30 *** 0.08 2.19 ** 0.07 8.53 *** -0.04 -5.35 *** 1.79 4.02 *** -0.27 -6.07 *** 
NEGt*FIN -0.01 -0.45 
 
0.05 0.80 
 
0.03 2.17 ** -0.01 -0.58 
 
-0.10 -0.24 
 
-0.08 -1.02 
 RETt*FIN -0.12 -3.20 *** -0.11 -3.07 *** 0.00 0.29 
 
0.01 0.64 
 
2.09 3.22 *** 0.10 1.38 
 NEGt*RETt*FIN 0.31 2.29 ** 0.30 1.95 * -0.14 -2.79 *** -0.02 -0.78 
 
1.94 0.66 
 
0.03 0.12 
 FCFt+1 
   
0.06 1.98 ** 
            NEGt*FCFt+1 
   
-0.02 -0.45 
             RETt*FCFt+1 
   
0.19 5.12 *** 
            NEGt*RETt*FCFt+1 
   
-0.50 -4.63 *** 
            CASHt+1 
            
-0.11 -4.19 *** -0.09 -2.82 *** 
NEGt*CASHt+1 
            
-0.02 -0.52 
 
-0.01 -0.32 
 RETt*CASHt+1 
            
-0.14 -3.51 *** -0.13 -2.72 *** 
NEGt*RETt*CASHt+1 
            
0.29 2.24 ** 0.24 2.03 ** 
∆CASHt+1 
            
0.16 5.36 *** 0.09 3.46 *** 
NEGt*∆CASHt+1 
            
0.03 0.61 
 
0.06 0.77 
 RETt*∆CASHt+1 
            
0.05 1.28 
 
0.10 3.68 *** 
NEGt*RETt*∆CASHt+1 
            
-0.01 -0.06 
 
-0.11 -0.62 
 CONSTANTt -0.05 -6.31 *** -0.06 -6.90 *** -0.13 -10.72 *** -0.02 -2.20 ** -0.05 -6.59 *** -0.01 -1.68 * 
CONTROLS YES 
  
YES 
  
YES 
  
YES 
  
YES 
  
YES 
  Adjusted R2 0.15 
  
0.15 
  
0.22 
  
0.15 
  
0.16 
  
0.13 
  Observations 89,091 
  
89,091 
  
22,022 
  
50,418 
  
87,399 
  
57,907 
  EARNINGSt is earnings before extraordinary items (IB) scaled by market value of equity. RETt is stock returns cumulated over the 12-month period ending 3 months after the fiscal year end. 
NEGt is an indicator equals one if RETt is negative. CONTROLS include BM, SIZE, LEVERAGE, an indicator variable for firm membership in high litigation risks industries and their 
interaction with NEGt, RETt and NEGt*RETt. All other variables are defined in the Appendix. Standard errors are corrected for cross-sectional and time-series dependence (Gow et al [2010], 
Petersen [2009]). ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 level or better, respectively (two-tailed test). 
